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MARYLAND RULE 5-704(b): 
WHERE TO DRAW THE LINE FOR ULTIMATE 
ISSUE TESTIMONY 
by Lisa Cuozzo 
Introduction 
In response to both the highly publicized trial of 
John Hinckley, Jr. in 1984 and the recommendations 
of the American Psychiatric Association (APA), 
Congress passed the Insanity Defense Reform Act of 
1984. 1 The Act changed many of the legal factors 
associated with the insanity defense, including the 
definition of legal insanity and the scope of expert 
testimony permitted in insanity trials. 2 Congress 
amended Federal Rule of Evidence 704 by adding a 
second section which prohibits expert testimony on 
ultimate issues of mental state or mental condition.3 
Maryland Rule of Evidence 5-704(b) maintains 
that prohibition of expert testimony for most ultimate 
issues but carves out one special exception. 
Maryland allows testimony only on the ultimate issue 
of criminal responsibility (Maryland's equivalent of the 
insanity defense).4 This paper discusses why 
Maryland Rule 5-704(b) should drop that exception 
and be modified to agree with Federal Rule 704(b). 
Section I explains the history of the Insanity Defense 
Reform Act of 1984. In Section II, the discussion 
turns to the rationale behind Maryland Rule 5-704(b). 
Section III compares both rules and explains why the 
Federal Rule results in a fairer trial. Finally, Section 
1 David Cohen, Punishing the Insane: Restriction of Expert Psychiatric 
Testimony by Federal Rule of Evidence 704 (b) , Title IV, Pub. L. No. 98-
473, 98 Stat. 2067 (1984), cited in 40 U. FLA. L. REV. 541 (1988) 
[hereinafter Reform Act). 
2 See id. 
3 FED. R. EVID. 704(b) reads: "No expert witness testifying with respect to 
the mental state or condition of a defendant in a criminal case may state 
an opinion or inference as to whether the defendant did or did not have 
the mental state or condition constituting an element of the crime charged . 
or of a defense thereto. Such ultimate issues are matters for the trier of 
fact alone." 
• MD. R. EVID. 5-704(b) reads: "An expert witness testifying with respect 
to the mental state or condition of a defendant in a criminal case may not 
state an opinion or inference as to whether the defendant had a mental 
state or condition constituting an element of the crime charged. That 
issue if for the trier of fact alone. This exception does not apply to an 
ultimate issue of criminal responsibility." (emphasis added). 
IV summarizes why the Maryland Rule intrudes on 
that fairness and proposes a modification of Maryland 
Rule 5-704(b). 
I. History of the Act 
In order to fully understand the Insanity Defense 
Reform Act, it is essential to examaine the history 
behind it, especially the trial of John W. Hinckley, Jr., 
and the political climate at that time. One must also 
understand the pressure that several interest groups 
-- especially theAPA -- exerted on Congress, in an 
effort to convince the legislature to agree with their 
position. 
A. Insanity Defense Before Hinckley 
Before the Insanity Defense Reform Act of 1984, 
federal courts employed the American Law Institute 
(AU) test for insanity. The ALI method is a two-prong 
test, which provides that "A person is not responsible 
for criminal conduct if, at the time of such conduct, as 
a result of mental disease or defect, he lacks 
substantial capacity either to appreciate the 
criminality (wrongfulness) of his conduct or to 
conform his conduct to the requirements of law. liS 
The first prong, referred to as the "cognitive prong," 
questions a person's capacity to know right from 
wrong. The second prong, conforming conduct to the 
law, is the "volitional prong." 
In 1982, the Reagan administration called for the 
abolition of the insanity defense. The administration 
essentially sought to restrict the admissibility of 
evidence of mental illness when offered to prove the 
defendant did not have the requisite intent for the 
crime charged. 6 In other words, such evidence would 
only be permitted if the defendant was completely 
unaware that he had a weapon in his hand, or was so 
delusional he did not know he was harming a 
5 MODEL PENAL CODE §4.01(1) (1962). 
6 Jonathan B. Sallet, After Hinckley: The Insanity Defense Reexamined, 
94 YALE L.J. 1545, 1546 (1985). 
28.1 U. Bait. L. F. 19 
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person.7 This movement, however, was unsuccessful 
and the ALI insanity defense remained intact until 
1984. 
B. Trial of Hinckley 
In 1976, John Hinckley, Jr. was a "drifter" 
temporarily living in Hollywood.8 He repeatedly 
watched the film Taxi Driver, starring the actress 
Jodie Foster, and started obsessing about Foster and 
President Reagan.9 In March of 1981, Hinckley, in an 
effort to impress Foster, attempted to assassinate 
President Reagan. 1o 
Hinckley's trial gained extensive media attention, 
not just because he targeted the President of the 
United States, but also because Hinckley claimed 
insanity as his defense. The government focused on 
premeditation, emphasizing that Hinckley purchased 
a gun and bullets, wrote a note to Foster immediately 
preceding the shooting, and basically stalked the 
President until he had a decent shot to take. ll The 
defense, however, focused on Hinckley's "process 
schizophrenia," especially his delusionsY As a 
result, the trial came down to a battle.of the experts. 
Hinckley was found not guilty by reason of insanity, 
and the public was outraged. 
C. Public Pressure 
Following the Hinckley trial, many groups 
initiated a movement to change the insanity defense. 
The APA, the American Medical Association, and the 
American Bar Association are only three of the 
groups that wrote to Congress seeking to change or 
abolish the defense. At the same time, the public 
was disgusted with the trial, the outcome, and the 
whole idea of the insanity defense. According to a 
survey conducted in the weeks following the Hinckley 
verdict, "40% of the public, if jurors, would have had 
no confidence in the psychiatric testimony; 20% 
would have had only slight confidence."13 
7 See id. 
B See id. at 1547. 
9 See id. at 1548. 
10 Seeid. 
It See id. 
12 David Cohen. Punishing the Insane: Restriction of Expert Psychiatric Testimony 
by Federal Rule of Evidence 704(b), 40 U. FLA l. REV. 541, 542 (1988) [hereinafter 
Cohen). 
13 Phillip J. Resnick, M.D., Perceptions of Psychiatric Testimony: A Historical 
Perspective of the Hysterical Invective, 14 BULL. AMER. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & l. 203 
(1986) [hereinafter Resnick). 
28.1 U. Bait. L. F. 20 
D. Congress Passes the Insanity Defense 
Reform Act 
Pressured to make some change, Congress 
passed the Insanity Defense Reform Act in 1984.14 
The Act added an extra section to Federal Rule of 
Evidence 704, thereby preventing expert testimony 
on ultimate issues of mental state or mental 
condition.15 
The Act was passed for three basic reasons: 
first, to "eliminate competing expert witnesses 
testifying to directly contradictory conclusions;"16 
second, because expert testimony was often 
unreliable and confused juries;17 and third, because 
experts were testifying to matters beyond their 
expertise.18 Congressional notes relied heavily on the 
APA's statement, which will be discussed in detail 
below. 
Although the most obvious effect the Insanity 
Defense Reform Act had on expert testimony was the 
modification to Rule 704, expert testimony has also 
been changed by the elimination of the volitional 
prong. As a result of the Act, Congress dropped the 
first prong of the ALI test. That change substantially 
limits the insanity defense to only those who are 
unable to understand right from wrong. This new 
definition of insanity in federal courts was 
recommended by the APA, probably because it 
"conforms with the way psychiatrists think and 
analyze mental processes."19 Psychiatrists can "be 
more comfortable in bringing [their] expertise to bear 
in a courtroom setting."20 The jury may have a better 
understanding of this definition as well, as "it avoids 
the artificiality of trying to separate intellectual from 
emotional understanding. "21 
In Maryland, however, the test for criminal 
responsibility remains the two-prong ALI test. 22 
Maryland, therefore, allows expert testimony on the 
defendant's ability to conform his conduct to the law 
despite the unreliability of such testimony. 
14 Reform Act, supra note 1. 
15 See id. 
16 S. REP. No. 225, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 231 (1983), reprinted in 1984 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182 [hereinafter S.Rep.). 
t7 Id. 
IBid. 
19 FAUST E. ROSSI, EXPERT WiTNESSES 524, 525 (1991) [hereinafter Rossi). 
20ld. 
211d. 
22 MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. §12-106 (1996). 
E. The APA Statement 
The APA statement carried a great deal of 
weight in Congress for changing the Insanity 
Defense. Congress echoed most of the APA's 
rationale in the legislative notes that accompany the 
Act, often quoting the APA statement verbatim. 
1. Usurping the Power from the Jury 
First, the APA and Congress both agreed that 
allowing expert testimony on the issue of criminal 
responsibility usurps the power of the jury. Although 
this rationale has been repeatedly referred to as 
"empty rhetoric,"23 "many commentators agree that 
clinicians . . . should stop short of answering the 
ultimate legal question."24 The APA statement 
pointed out that "determining whether a criminal 
defendant was legally insane is a matter for legal fact-
finders, not for experts. ,,25 The Senate Report echoed 
the APA, stating, "Section 406 of Title IV of the Bill 
amends Rule 704; [The] purpose of this amendment 
is to eliminate the confusing spectacle of competing 
expert witnesses testifying to directly contradictory 
conclusions as to the ultimate legal issue to be 
found by the trier of fact."26 The House of 
Representatives agreed, seeking to disallow expert 
testimony on ultimate issues and leave it to the jury to 
apply "societal or community values."27 
2. Verdict Depends on Credibility of Experts 
Second, the essential issue in the trial, namely, 
whether the defendant is indeed responsible, 
disappears when conflicting expert testimony on 
responsibility is permitted. The controversial issue for 
the jury to decide then becomes one of the credibility 
of the expert witnesses rather than the responsibility 
of the defendant. 28 That was clearly the case in the 
Hinckley trial, where the prosecution refused to 
stipulate that Hinckley was delusional. 
Some issues of credibility cannot be avoided 
when experts offer conflicting testimony; however, the 
23 7 WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE §1920-21 (1940). 
24 Stephen K. Hoge and Thomas Grisso, Accuracy and Expert Testimony, 20 BULL 
AMER. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 71 (1992) [hereinafter Hoge and Grisso]. 
25 APA Statement on Insanity Defense, 140 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 681, 686 (1983) 
[hereinafter APA Statement]. 
26 S. Rep., supra note 15 [emphasis added]. 
27 H. R. REPORT No. 557, 98th Congo 1st Session (1983)., cited in Anne Lawson 
Braswell, Resurrection of the Ultimate Issue Rule: Federal Rule of Evidence 704(b) 
and The Insanity Defense, 72 Cornell L. Rev. 620, 626 (1987). 
28 Anne Lawson Braswell, Resurrection of the Ultimate Issue Rule: Federal Rule 
of Evidence 704(b) and The Insanity Defense, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 620, 628 (1987) 
[hereinafter Braswell]. 
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federal rule limits conflicting testimony by limiting the 
scope of expert opinion. Since ultimate issue 
testimony is not permitted in federal court, the experts 
are limited to explaining the defendant's diagnosis, 
symptoms, and history. Often, those are areas on 
which the prosecution and the defense agree, 
disputing only the severity of the symptoms. Thus, 
there is a likelihood in federal court that the experts 
will, in large part, agree with each other. Jurors can 
then deliberate on the responsibility issue, feeling 
more confident that both sides' experts were telling 
the truth about diagnosis, history, and symptoms. 
In Maryland court, where ultimate issue 
testimony is permitted, the experts will often voice 
their disagreement over the issue of responsibility. 
The expert is not required to limit his testimony, so he 
can freely testify that the defendant is or is not 
responsible, without further explanation. Jurors are 
then left hearing conflicting testimony, and the 
question in the jury room becomes "Which expert did 
you believe?", rather than "Is he responsible?" 
Philip Resnick offers six possible explanations 
for the psychiatrists' disagreement in the courtroom. 
First, such disagreement is bound to result from the 
nature of the adversarial system. Second, attorneys 
implement witness selection procedures that result in 
conflicting testimony. Third, there are many different 
schools of psychiatry and, for example, a cognitive 
therapist will give a different answer than a 
psychodynamic therapist would. Fourth, experts may 
use different data. Fifth, experts may be biased. 
Sixth, and lastly, he notes the occasional "venality" 
of some experts. 29 
If the experts are permitted to take the stand 
and answer the ultimate question, juries are often 
forced to decide the case on credibility of those 
experts; the jury is not given the chance to simply 
"evaluate the experts' reasoning."30 Jurors are likely 
to receive inaccurate testimony in many courts that 
allow experts to answer the ultimate question without 
a full explanation. "Such testimony obscures the 
special expertise of the mental-health professional 
and the distinctions between clinical and moral 
dimensions. ,,31 
29 Resnick, supra note 13, at 209. 
30 Braswell, supra note 28, at 628. 
31 Hoge and Grisso, supra note 24, at 71. 
28.1 U. Bait. L. F. 21 
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3. Confuses the Jury 
Expert testimony also tends to confuse the jury, 
especially because psychiatric terminology and legal 
terminology are not synonymous.32 Sanity, for 
example, is a legal issue, not a medical one. 33 
Clinical diagnoses, such as psychosis, have no legal 
equivalent legal definition and have no correlation to 
legal insanity or non-responsibility.34 According to the 
APA, when a mental health expert is asked a 
question about the ultimate legal issue, he "is 
required to make a leap in logic; he no longer 
addresses himself to medical concepts but instead 
must infer or intuit what is in fact unspeakable, 
namely, the probable relationship between medical 
concepts and legal or moral concepts. These leaps 
confuse the jury."35 That statement from the APA was 
incorporated into the legislative history of the Insanity 
Defense Reform Ace6 and heavily relied on by 
Congress. 
Expert psychiatric testimony is also confusing 
because it is unreliable. Jurors often hear expert 
opinion, or test results, and do not know how much 
weight to give that testimony because it may be 
unreliable. In response to the mental health field's 
inability to reliably assess a defendant's behavior at 
the exact moment of the crime, many instruments are 
now being used to assist the practitioner with his 
prediction. Tests like the Mental State at the Time of 
the Offense Screening Evaluation (MSO), the 
Research Diagnostic Criteria (RDC), and the Rogers 
Criminal Responsibility Assessment Scales (R-CRAS) 
"were designed to translate the legal insanity 
concepts into quantifiable variables that would meet 
the standard of reasonable scientific certainty."37 The 
R-CRAS measures the patient's "reliability, organicity, 
psychopathology, cognitive control, and behavioral 
control. "38 
As Stephen Morse, an expert in forensic 
psychology, points out, any test given to the 
defendant is administered after the crime - sometimes 
32 APA statement, supra note 25, at 681. 
33 See id. 
34 Hoge and Grisso, supra note 24, at 73. 
35 APA Statement, supra note 25, at 686. 
36 Reform Act, supra note 1. 
37 Michaell. Perlin, Unpacking the Myths: The Symbolism Mythology of Insanity 
Defense Jurisprudence, 40 CASE W. RES. l. REV. 599, 656 (1989-90) [hereinafter 
Perlin]. 
38 Id., at 656 n.251. 
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well after the crime - so the results "tell the factfinder 
nothing definite about defendant's behavior at the 
time of the crime. "39 Morse therefore questions how 
much the evidence really assists the jury and how 
reliable it really is in the decision-making process. At 
least with these scientific evaluations, however, the 
jury can hear testimony about reliability of the test 
used, rather than just hearing personal opinions from 
the expert's experience. 
4. The Verdict Involves Moral and Social 
Judgments 
Also, as the APA explained, the issue of criminal 
responsibility has moral and social judgments as well 
as the legal and psychological decisions.40 
Psychiatrists have no expertise in this field or with 
moral judgments. The APA statistics show a high 
degree of reliability (about 80%) "so long as 
psychiatric testimony is restricted to medical and 
scientific, and not legal or moral issues."41 When the 
jury considers criminal responsibility, however, the 
issue is entirely legal and moral, therefore reducing 
the reliability of the expert testimony.42 
Instead of making a moral decision for th.e jury, 
the doctor's job in court is to "present medical 
information and opinion about the defendant's mental 
state and motivation and explain in detail reasons for 
his medical conclusion."43 If the expert is permitted to 
make judgments about the defendant's sanity, there 
is fear the jury "may be led, incorrectly, to infer that 
the ultimate questions to be resolved are scientific 
rather than moral and experts are permitted to 
express opinions on questions which are beyond 
clinical expertise."44 
Morse points out that "speculations, 
assumptions, and assertions are not substitutes for 
hard evidence; unreliable and invalid scientific 
evidence cannot assist the factfinder and it may be 
39 Stephen Morse, Failed Explanations and Criminal Responsibility: Experts and 
Unconsciousness, 68 VA. L. REV. 971,1051 (1982) [hereinafter Morse]. 
40 APA Statement, supra note 25, at 683. 
411d. 
42 Well-known expert Michael Perlin explains the insanity defense as a "natural for 
philosophical debates," because it involves "notions of free will, determinism, 
responsibility, rationality, community standards. and ethical perspectives." Perlin. 
supra note 37, at 666. 
43 APA Statement, supra note 25, at 686. 
44 Richard J. Bonnie and Christopher Siobogin, The Role of Mental Health 
Professionals in the Criminal Process: The Case for Informed Speculation, 66 VA. 
l. REV. 427, 456 (1980) [hereinafter Bonnie and Siobogin]. 
misleading and prejudicial."45 Maryland ignores the 
unreliability and moral implications, and permits the 
"expert" to render an opinion totally outside his 
expertise. 
Congress agreed with all of the foregoing 
reasons offered by the APA: usurping the jury power, 
experts battling for credibility, the potential of 
confusing the jury, and the moral aspect tied up with 
the verdict. In a time when the public was amazed at 
Hinckley's acquittal, Congress chose to limit the 
defense exactly as the psychiatrists - the experts 
themselves - recommended. 
II. Maryland Rule 5-704(b) 
Although Congress enacted the Insanity Reform 
Act, Maryland has not adopted the federal 
modification verbatim. Instead, Maryland codifies the 
first part of the federal rule, rejecting opinions about 
certain mental states like intent or predisposition, but 
then adds an exception permitting opinion about the 
ultimate issue of responsibility.46 47 In other words, a 
mental health expert would not be permitted, under 
Maryland Rule 5-704(b), to give his opinion whether 
the defendant was able to form the requisite intent for 
murder in the first degree, or whether he was 
predisposed to entrapment. 48 However, if the 
defendant offers a not-criminally responsible plea, 
then, and only then, mayan expert give an opinion on 
the ultimate issue. As the Rule Committee 
Comments to Maryland Rule 5-704(b) explain, the 
expert witness "can be asked if defendant was 
suffering from mental disorder, the result of which 
caused him to lack substantial capacity to conform to 
law."49 
Why did Maryland carve out the narrow 
exception allowing opinion testimony only on the 
issue of criminal responsibility? Most Maryland courts 
maintain that there is little difference in opinion 
pointing to the ultimate question and opinion that 
actually answers the ultimate question. "The 
45 Morse. supra note 39, at 1048. 
46 MD. R. EVlo. 5-704, §2.704.4 (b)(ii), 199. 
47 It is important to know what exactly is an ultimate issue. The Maryland Court of 
Special Appeals explains the ultimate issue as the element of the crime that either 
acquits or convicts the defendant. "The credibility of a witness is not an ultimate 
issue ... [defendantj could not be imprisoned on the basis of such allegation and 
proof." Yount v. State, 99 Md. App. 207, 215, 636 A.3d. 50, 54 (1993). In 
contrast. "the corpus delecti of the crime" or the "criminal agency of the defendant" 
are both ultimate issues. See id. 
48 Examples taken from S. REP .• supra note 16. 
49 Md. R. Evid. 5-704. supra note 46. 
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distinction between an opinion as to a predicate fact 
that inevitably yields the ultimate fact and an opinion 
as to the ultimate fact itself [is] a distinction without a 
difference. "50 It seems Maryland courts simply were 
accustomed to allowing answers on all ultimate 
issues, as was permitted before the Hinckley trial and 
the Insanity Defense Reform Act. It is important to 
note, however, that Maryland did adopt Federal Part 
8, and then added the provision that "[t]his exception 
does not apply to an ultimate issue of criminal 
responsibility. "51 
A. Expert Opinion on Intent 
The question that remains is, why did Maryland 
keep the rest of Federal 704(b), forbidding opinion on 
mens rea, or intent issues. The Maryland Court of 
Appeals suggests it may be because "a psychiatrist 
cannot precisely reconstruct the emotions of a person 
at a specific time."52 Whether the defendant had the 
intent or predisposition, for example, is mere 
conjecture, and beyond the expertise of mental health 
experts. 
The Maryland Court of Special Appeals also 
explained that "intention is a fact which the accused 
can testify to but it cannot be [any] other person 
testify[ing] directly concerning the intention of 
another. "53 One trial court had allowed the expert to 
answer that, due to the defendant's substance abuse 
and intoxication, the defendant had "no reason or 
understanding at the time of the crime."54 The trial 
court, however, would not allow testimony that, 
because he was under the influence, a defendant 
could not form the necessary mens rea for the 
specific intent crime of first degree murder.55 The 
Maryland Court of Appeals found no error, holding 
that the trial judge was correct in refusing testimony 
about intent or mens rea. 56 
B. Expert Opinion on Volition 
The APA points out that psychiatric opInion 
about a defendant's ability to control his behavior, 
previously part of the federal test for insanity, is often 
50 Cirincione v. Maryland, 75 Md. App. 166. 182. 540 A.2d 1151. 1159 (1988). 
51 MD. R. EVlo. 5-704(b), supra note 4. at 196. 
52 Simmons v. State, 313 Md. 33.48.542 A.2d 1258, 1265 (1986) (discouraging 
expert testimony on the issue of honest belief of self defense). 
53 Cirincione v. State, 75 Md. App. 166. 180. 540 A.2d 1151. 1158 (1988). See 
also Hartless v. State. 327 Md. 558.611 A.2d 581 (1992). 
54 Cirincione. 75 Md. App.at 181. 540 A.2d at 1185. 
55 See id. at 180. 540 A.2d at 1158. 
56 See id. at 182, 540 A.2d 1159. 
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unreliable and entirely without scientific basis. 57 
However, when restricted to the effect of mental 
illness, such as whether one could reason or 
understand, the opinion is within the realm of the 
psychiatrist's expertise. It is difficult for the 
psychiatric expert to make a hindsight assessment as 
to whether or not the defendant a) may have had an 
intent to commit the crime or b) whether the 
defendant could control himself at the time he 
committed the crime. 
Mental health experts have a great deal of 
trouble predicting whether a defendant is insane as 
prescribed by the Maryland ALI test. It may be within 
their expertise to opine on the definition, symptoms, 
or effect of the illness, but psychiatrists cross the line 
when they claim to know the defendant's thought 
processes influencing control at the time of the 
offense. As the APA statement pointed out, "the line 
between an irresistible impulse and an impulse not 
resisted is probably no sharper than that between 
twilight and dusk."sa The APA rejects the volition test 
because "psychiatric testimony about volition is more 
likely to produce confusion for jurors" than expert 
testimony about defendant's understanding right from 
wrong.59 
Maryland, in keeping the volitional prong, adds 
to jury confusion by making the the insanity defense 
difficult to understand and promotes unreliable 
testimony. Experts in Maryland are testifying to 
whether the defendant can control his behavior even 
though these experts themselves, in the APA 
statement, expressed their inability to assess a 
defendant's volition. 
III. Comparison between Maryland Rule and 
Federal Rule 
In everyday practice, the difference between 
federal and Maryland courts centers around the 
specific words permitted, the questions admitted, and 
the extent of the role of experts in the courtroom. The 
federal rule, however, allows the same information to 
reach the jury in a manner such that the experts do 
not usurp the jury's role, confuse them, or make 
moral judgments for them. 
57 APA Statement. supra note 25, at 685. 
s8/d. 
59/d. 
28.1 U. Bait. L. F. 24 
A. Questions Permitted 
1. Federal Court 
In federal court, for example, the expert would 
not be permitted to answer the question "Did X's 
illness impair X's ability to appreciate the 
wrongfulness of his crime?" or "Could X still 
understand the wrongfulness of the crime?" Any 
answer given would answer the ultimate issue. On 
the other hand, the same expert could explain in 
great detail the defendant's mental illness and the 
effect that illness has on his ability to understand. 
Thus, the expert could respond to the question "Was 
X suffering from bipolar disorder?" and then go on to 
explain the symptoms of this particular condition. As 
long as the discussion is kept to psychiatric or 
medical terms and focuses on the effect of the illness 
in general, as opposed to the effect on the defendant, 
the question will most likely be permissible. Likewise, 
an expert could answer to "What are the effects or 
symptoms of schizophrenia?" or "Does schizophrenia 
affect one's ability to differentiate between fantasy 
and reality?" Since the attorney can ask these 
background questions and keep them vague, the 
expert witness can avoid giving the ultimate answer 
as to the defendant's responsibility. 
The Federal Rule simply "changes the style of 
question and answer that can be used to establish 
both the offense and the defense thereto."so As 
before, everything underlying the opinion is still 
permitted, and all testimony pointing to the ultimate 
issue is permitted.s1 
As the legislative history of 704(b) reflects. the 
witness "must be permitted to testify fully about 
defendant's psychiatric diagnosis, mental state, and 
motivation at the time of the alleged act. "S2 The line 
is drawn so that witnesses cannot tell the jury how to 
find; the jury must do the work themselves. Although 
it prohibits certain questions, "it is clear that Rule 
704(b). as interpreted, has not significantly handi-
capped the receipt of psychological testimony in 
criminal cases. "S3 
2. Maryland Court 
Maryland courts would provide wide latitude and 
permit the expert to say anything, although still 
60 U.S. v. Mest, 789 F.2d 1069, 1071 (4th Cir. 1986). 
61/d. 
62 S. REP. No. 225, quoted in Braswell, supra note 28, at 625. 
63 Rossi, supra note 19, at 113. 
maintaining that the expert provide the basis for his 
opinion rather than just stating the conclusion. 
Maryland would therefore do the same as the federal 
courts, but would then go a step further by permitti!lg 
the expert to answer a question such as, "In your 
opinion, was X criminally responsible for his actions 
on March 24, 1997?" This would be allowed even 
though the expert is in no better position than the jury 
to know how X was thinking at that particular time on 
March 24. 
Dr. Jonas Rappeport, a well-known forensic 
psychiatry expert in Maryland, favors the Maryland 
rule. He is vehemently opposed to the federal rule, 
and enjoys giving his opinion on the ultimate issue 
whenever possible.64 Dr. Rappeport feels the federal 
rule "castrates your testimony because you can't tie 
everything together."65 In his . experience, most 
federal judges let him go on, ignoring the federal rule. 
He advocates testifying against the federal rule 
because "every time you say anything in federal 
court, the prosecutor gets up and says you're in 
sacred ground."66 Dr. Rappeport also states that he 
has seen many defense attorneys trying to 
circumvent the rule by asking hypotheticals. 
As one of the authors of the APA statement, Dr. 
Rappeport categorizes it as a political move more 
than anything else. He states, however, that the APA 
position is still the same today as it was in 1984. 
3. Hypothetical Questions 
Many savvy lawyers try to circumvent Federal 
Rule 704(b) whenever possible, hoping the trial judge 
will not realize the lawyer is overstepping his bounds. 
There has been some disagreement in federal courts 
regarding where to draw the line, especially with 
hypothetical questions containing facts that mirror the 
case on trial. 
The Eighth Circuit has found: 
[T]he fact that part of the wording of a 
question may track the legal test by 
asking if the disease prevents one 
suffering from the disease from 
understanding the nature and quality 
of an act does not violate the rule 
[because] the jury is left to ultimately 
64 Telephone interview with Jonas Rappeport, M.D., expert in forensic psychiatry 




decide whether the disease was so 
strongly present that the defendant 
himself suffered the effect of being 
unable to appreciate the quality of his 
act. 67 
That position seems to be disfavored, however, 
because most other circuits have found that similar 
hypothetical questions come too close to the line. In 
United States v. Smarf8 , a D.C. Circuit case, the 
government's drug expert was asked a hypothetical 
question involving facts identical to those in the 
case.6970 In answer to the hypothetical, the witness 
said "[H]e met the elements."71 The court of appeals 
noted that it was a "close question" because most 
cases in federal circuits find a violation when the word 
"intent" is used, however in t:lis case the word 
"element" was used.72 The court ultimately held that 
for the trial court to have allowed the hypothetical was 
error.73 
The Smart case was distinguished from United 
States v. Boyd, also from the D.C. Circuit, in which 
the government also posed a hypothetical, except 
that the expert witness used the word "intent" in his 
answer.74 In Boyd, the court of appeals held that the 
expert testimony violated Federal Rule 704(b) 
because the witness was giving an opinion about the 
necessary mental state for the crime charged.75 
67 U.S. v. Kristiansen, 901 F.2d 1463,1466 (8th Cir. 1990). 
68 U.S. v. Smart, 98 F.3d 1379 (D.C. Cir 1996). 
69 The prosecutor asked the witness: "A person is observed walking directly to a 
spot located next to a building ... picks up a large white, rock-like substance 
wrapped in plastic. Within minutes that person is stopped and has a large. white, 
rock-like substance on him. It's 25.5 grams that turns out to be cocaine base. He 
also has a pager, $580 in bills, 56 empty Ziploc bags, and a 9 millimeter handgun. 
With what activity are these actions consistent?" 
The defense objected, on the grounds it was not a hypothetical question. The 
objection was overruled and the expert answered that according to the 
hypothetical, the person was involved in a drug operation. Smart, 98 F.3d at 1385. 
70 As the Smart case illustrates, many circuit courts have extended the federal rule 
so it also excludes ultimate issue testimony by law enforcement officers who are 
offered as experts in drug cases, perhaps limiting expert testimony even more than 
Congress intended. 
It is interesting to note that legislative history, contained in the Senate Report, 
suggests Congress only intended to limit expert testimony by mental health 
experts, but no federal circuit court has drawn such a limit. GRAHAM, HANDBOOK 
OF FEDERAL EVIDENCE, §704.2 (4th ed. 1996). 
711d. 
72 Smart, 98 F.3d at 1386. 
73 The court held the error was harmless, however, due to the totality of property 
admiHed evidence against Smart and the absence of eXCUlpatory evidence. Id. at 
1390. 
74 U.S. v. Boyd, 55 F.3d 667,670 (D.C. Cir, 1995). The witness answered that the 
facts of the hypothetical showed "possession with intent to distribute." Id. 
75 See Smart, 98F3d at 1387. 
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Apparently, use of the word "intent" automatically 
violates 704(b), stepping over the line of ultimate 
issue territory.76 In order to resolve their close 
question, the Smart court looked to the rationale 
underlying the rule, especially the rationale of 
preventing juries from attaching "undue weight" to 
expert testimony.77 Ultimately, the court held that the 
testimony came too close to the 704(b) line because 
of the "context of the interchange and the use of other 
words connoting intent. "7B 
The D.C. Circuit adopted the Seventh Circuit 
rule, which instructs the court to consider two key 
elements of the testimony: (1) the language used by 
either the attorney or the expert; and (2) whether the 
context clearly shows the expert opinion is "based on 
knowledge of general criminal practices" and not a 
special or personal knowledge of the defendant's 
practices.79 
Likewise, the Eleventh Circuit dealt with 
hypothetical questions in the Manley case, holding 
that "courts cannot permit the use of the hypothetical 
question as a vehicle to circumvent the clear mandate 
of Rule 704(b)."BO In that case, the key word "intent" 
was not even used. Rather, the defense asked its 
expert whether, hypothetically, a person suffering 
from bipolar disorder would "be able to appreciate the 
nature and quality or the wrongfulness of their 
actions."B1 Thus, the defense attorney phrased his 
hypothetical in the exact terms of the insanity rule 
itself. The objection was sustained and the expert 
was not permitted to answer. 
The Manley court contrasted another Eleventh 
Circuit case, United States v. Davis.B2 In the Davis 
case the question was whether a person with multiple 
personality disorder was able to understand what he 
was doing. The court allowed the expert to answer 
because the question "sought an explanation of the 
disease and its typical effect on a person's mental 
state. "B3 
761d. 
77 See id. 
78 Id. at 13B9. 
791d. paraphrasing United States v. Lipscomb, 14 F.3d 1236 (7th Cir. 1994). 
80 U.S. v. Manley, 893 F.2d 1221, 1223 (11th Cir. 1990). 
81 Id. at 1222. 
82 U.S. v. Davis, 835 F.2d 274 (11th Cir. 1988) (cited in Manley, 893 F.2d at 1224). 
83 Davis at 835 F.2d at 274, (cited in Manley, 893 F.2d at 1224). 
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These cases establish that the key element is 
the particular words used; one cannot phrase the 
question in the exact terminology as the insanity test 
itself, yet background questions that elicit a better 
understanding of the mental illness will be admitted. 
According to the Eleventh Circuit, Congress intended 
to allow expert testimony on the issue of whether the . 
defendant's behavior corresponded to a certain 
diagnosis.B4 After that, the jury decides whether, 
because of the mental disorder, the defendant was 
insane at the time of the crime.B5 
Perhaps the Second Circuit summarized it best 
when Judge McLaughlin explained that the testimony 
in question was impermissible because it "stat[ed] the 
bottom-line inference, leaving it to the jury merely to 
murmur, 'Amen."'B6 The Federal Rule prohibits the 
expert from stating the inference, so that the expert 
"must leave the inference, however obvious, for the 
jury to draw."B7 
In the Maryland courts, of course, one need not 
pose a hypothetical because the witness is permitted 
to answer specific questions regarding the 
defendant's responsibility. There is no need for line 
drawing because the court has unlimited discretion to 
allow expert opinions on the question of 
responsibility. 
B. Criticism of Maryland Rule 704(b) 
Therefore, while the jury's bottom-line question 
remains the same no matter which court hears the 
case, the way the jury answers that question will vary, 
depending where they are. Thus, when in federal 
court, the jury will have to absorb all of the testimony 
illustrating the effect of mental illness and apply that 
information to the facts at hand. Conversely, in 
Maryland court, the jury has already heard the mental 
health expert state that "X was unable to appreciate 
the wrongfulness of his conduct," so the only 
remaining question is whether the expert is believable 
and convincing. Also, if there are two conflicting 
experts in Maryland court, i.e., one for each side, the 
jury is likely to be confused and the issue comes 
down to which expert is more credible and 
84 The attorney could ask, for example, "Is this behavior indicative of anti-social 
personality?" Id. 
851d. 
86 U.S. V. DiDomenico, 985 F.2d 1159.1165 (2nd Cir. 1993). 
87 Id. (referring to U.S. v. Alvarez, 837 F.2d 1024 (11th Cir. 1988)). 
convincing. That is particularly the question 
Congress wanted to eliminate by enacting Part B. 
1. Expert Testimony is to Assist the Jury 
Expert testimony, no matter what the subject, is 
offered to "assist the trier of fact. "88 Maryland's rule, 
however, goes beyond that. It not only helps the jury, 
but does the jury's job for them. A question arises as 
to which of the following answers would assist the 
jury: (1) "X could not appreciate the wrongfulness of 
the crime and therefore is not responsible;" (2) "X's 
delusions at the time could have misled him so that 
he thought he was stabbing a bear in self defense, 
and not a person." While the former may help the 
jury go home earlier because they are given the 
answer to the ultimate issue, the latter example 
actually helps them in deliberations and helps them 
reach the ultimate issue on their own. 
Further, the first answer involves issues of 
morality and responsibility, whereas the second 
illustrates the effect of the illness, without 
incorporating legal concepts. Although the first 
answer mayor may not be reliable' or valid, 
"testimony regarding the nature and relative severity 
of defendant's psychological dysfunction and 
informed estimates of what he may have known, 
perceived, or intended at a particular time, lie within 
the expertise of mental health professionals."89 It is 
more helpful for the jury to receive testimony in the 
form of the second answer because the jurors receive 
reliable, psychiatric testimony that is not couched in 
legal jargon. 
As Morse explained, "experts offering legal 
conclusions are operating as extra, unnecessary 
jurors."90 If the expert is on the stand to assist· the 
jury with the evidence that is beyond their knowledge, 
the expert should limit his testimony to that type of 
material only. Once he states whether or not the 
defendant was responsible, he becomes the 
thirteenth juror. 
2. The issue of criminal responsibility is no 
more difficult than other jury issues. 
The question remains: Why bother making a 
special exception just for criminal responsibility? 
Criminal responsibility is no more difficult than any 
other issue for the jury. Expert testimony is utilized 
88 FED, R EVID, 702. 
89 Bonnie and Siobogin, supra note 44, at 456 (emphasis added). 
90 Morse, supra note 39, at 1057. 
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because the expert is presumed to be more 
competent to answer the questions than the jury. 
However, the concept of criminal responsibility is not 
beyond the understanding of the jury, so long as they 
are given the legal test. The jurors are equally as 
competent as the expert witness to take all of the 
evidence, incorporate that evidence into the facts, 
and create a complete picture ultimately leading to 
their verdict. 
Federal Rule 704(b) encourages the expert to 
explain any and all information to assist the jury in 
reaching a decision. Likewise, Rule 705 permits the 
court to require the expert to give his underlying facts 
or data. With all of those facts offered for the jury to 
digest, asking for expert opinion on the defendant's 
criminal responsibility seems like overkill. Maryland 
should give its juries more credit, assuming they are 
able to take all the information provided and 
competently apply the information to the criminal 
responsibility test. 
3. Maryland fosters confusion 
The rationale underlying Federal Rule 704(b) 
pertains to Maryland Rule 5-704(b) as well. One of 
the most compelling reasons provided by Congress 
was to "eliminate the confusing spectacle of 
competing expert witnesses testifying to contradictory 
conclusions. ,,91 Maryland instead fosters such 
confusion by encouraging experts to take the stand 
and opine as to the defendant's ability to appreciate 
the wrongfulne~s of his alleged crime at the time it 
was committed. 
4. The "expert" has no expertise 
The second reason supported by Congress is 
perhaps the most significant: mental health "experts" 
are not experts in law92 or moral issues. Expert 
testimony is presented simply because the expert 
possesses some "scientific, technical, or other 
specialized knowledge."93 However, as the APA and 
Congress agree, the mental health expert does not 
have any special knowledge when it comes to legal 
terms. He or she is an expert in mental health 
issues, concepts, and theory. Thus, any testimony 
given should be restricted to only those issues, 
concepts, and theories. Responsibility for crime is 
not a scientific concept. 
91 S. REP., supra note 16. at 231. 
92'd, 
93 FED. R. EVID. 702. 
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Dr. Jay Katz is an expert in this field and has 
examined the issue from both perspectives. 
According to Katz, a psychiatrist and professor of law, 
permitting expert testimony on the ultimate issue 
contributes significantly to the so called "battle of the 
experts. "94 Katz insists he will not answer ultimate 
questions in court because those are questions a 
psychiatrist cannot answer.95 "I can tell a story that I 
hope will aid judge and jury in making the moral/legal 
judgment that only they can make. "96 He is in favor of 
the federal rule prohibiting testimony on the 
responsibility question because it would force the 
psychiatric expert "to [attend] to the person and, after 
all, it is the person they have been trained to evaluate 
and not the law's jurisprudence. "97 Moreover, Katz 
believes the experts should express "the uncertainties 
that affect their judgments and conclusions" and 
believes we should be critical of the questions 
lawyers are permitted to ask.98 
5. Jury participation leads to a fairer trial 
It also seems the defendant gets a fairer trial if 
the jury makes the decision instead of just adopting 
the expert's opinion based solely on the assumption 
that the expert is more knowledgable. Although 
Professor Wigmore characterized the idea of usurping 
the jury's function as "empty rhetoric,"99 there is 
something to be said for asking the jury to sift through 
the evidence themselves, deliberate, and reach an 
independent decision. The jury system is in place to 
ensure fairness; twelve impartial people are supposed 
to be the fact finders. If the jury is going to accept the 
expert's opinion without careful consideration, the trial 
may as well be a bench trial. It is not the 
psychiatrist's job to set the standard and decide who 
is responsible and who is not. That is strictly the jury's 
responsibility. Do we, as a society concerned with 
justice, really want someone's fate to be based not on 
the facts in the case, but on which side can hire a 
94 Jay Katz, M.D., "The Fallacy of the Impartial Expert" Revisited, 20 BULL. AMER. 
ACAD. PSYCHIATRY AND l. 141, 146 (1992). 
95 See id. at 148. 
96 Id. 
97 Id. at 147. 
98 Id. at 149-50. 
99 WIGMORE, supra note 23. 
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more credible expert? Maryland Rule 5-704(b) 
stands in the way of fairness because the question of 
the ultimate issue, and therefore the defendant's fate, 
is in the hands of the experts. The verdict comes 
down to "may the most credible expert win", not "may 
justice be done." 
IV. Proposal 
Maryland's exception allowing opinion testimony 
on the issue of responsibility is misplaced. The issue 
of responsibility is the most difficult and unreliable 
area of mental health expertise. There is no 
reason to treat testimony on criminal responsibility 
any differently from testimony on intent, 
predisposition, malice, or other mental states. Mental 
health professionals have no higher ability to predict 
responsibility for the crime than they have to predict 
intent. If Maryland is going to continue to codify 
Federal Rule 704(b), the Maryland Rule should drop 
the last sentence and adopt the federal rule verbatim. 
V. Conclusion 
Congress enacted Federal Rule 704(b) in 
response to the overwhelming outrage of the insa'nity 
defense and Hinckley's trial. Although the impetus 
behind the Insanity Defense Reform Act was the APA 
statement and public outcry, the Act itself changed 
the insanity qefense for the better. 
Tho fears addressed by the APA statement --
usurping the power of the jury; confusing the jury; 
experts making moral judgments; and a verdict 
dependant on credibility of witnesses -- still survive 
today. These fears are legitimate and stand in the 
way of a defendant getting a fair trial. 
Maryland Rule 5-704(b) attempts to alleviate 
those fears when it comes to intent or mental state, 
but does nothing for the defendant who pleads not 
criminally responsible. For that defendant, his trial is 
still a "battle of the experts," with the experts 
determining the outcome rather than the facts 
determining his fate. 
Maryland should give the APA statement a 
thorough reading and do some further research. 
Federal Rule 704(b) exists as it does for good reason 
- to preserve the integrity of the trial and try to 
promote fairness and jury involvement. 
